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AN ANALYSIS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
Gross negligence is both historically and contemporaneously an
important segment of our American tort and contract law. Yet, when
one attempts to define "gross negligence," the concept shatters into a
kaleidoscopic disarray of terms, elements and subtle graduations of
meaning. It is a legal Tower of Babel, where many voices are heard,
but few are really understood.'
Negligence itself is an elastic term which is not confined within
strict bounds. 2 It is relative as to circumstance, place and person, and
what may be negligence as to one person may not be negligence as to
another.3 It is basically a failure to excercise the degree of care de-
manded by the circumstances,4 or a failure to use the care which an
ordinarily prudent man would use under the circumstances.5 It has
also been said to be "conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonably great risk of
harm."6
However, some jurisdictions, though affirming a certain relativity
in negligence, have attempted to set up distinct guide-posts of liability
by adopting the theory of the three degrees of negligence, or its pos-
itive counterpart the three degrees of care. 7 "Slight negligence" has
been defined as "an absence of that degree of care and vigilance which
persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight are accustomed to
use." s "Ordinary negligence," though variously defined, is fundament-
ally a failure to exercise such care as the great mass of mankind ex-
ercise under the same or similar circumstances.9 "Gross negligence"
has been defined as a want of even slight care,20 failure to exercise
'Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469, 14 L. Ed. 1019, 1021(1853); Raymond v. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529, 62 A. 602, 605 (1905);
Oliver v. Kantor, 122 N.J. Eq. 205, 6 A. 2d 205, 207 (1939); HARPER, TORTS
176 (1933) ; PoL.ocK, TORTS 457 (13th ed. 1929) ; PROSSE, TORTS 258 (1941).
2 Lynch v. Lynch, 9 W. W. Harr. 1, 195 A. 799, 802 (Del. 1938) ; Esposito v.
St George Swimming Club, 255 N.Y.S. 794, 801, 143 Misc. 15 (1932); 65
C.J.S. NEGLIGENCE §1; 1 SHEARMAN and REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE §2 (Zipp.,
1941). Contra: Wittstruck v. Lee, 252 N.W. 874, 877 (S.D. 1934).
8 Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal. App. 2d 187, 134 P. 2d 522, 528 (1943) ; Kent
v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 189 S.E. 332, 334 (1937).4 Reese v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 239 U.S. 463 (1915) ; Webber v. Pinyan,
9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P. 2d 183 (1937) ; Harker v. Burlington C. R. & N. R. Co.,
88 Iowa 409, 55 N.W. 316 (1893).5 Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F. 2d 502 (1934); Yocum v. Holmes, 258 S.W. 2d
535 (Ark. 1953); Picket v. Waldorf System, 241 Mass. 569, 136 N.E. 64
(1922).6 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §282 (1934) ; PROSSER, TORTS 175 (1941).
7 See, e.g., 20 R.C.L. §16; 65 C.J.S. NEGLIGENCE §8.
8 Dreher v. Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 675, 677 (1868).
9 Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W. 209, 212 (1921).
'0 Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 P. 62, 66 (1930) ; Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. George, 279 Ky. 24, 129 S.W. 2d 986, 988 (1939); Johnson v. State, 66
Ohio St 59, 63 N.E. 607, 609 (1902).
reasonable care,"1 and very great negligence. 2 Some courts have held
that gross negligence remains an inadvertent act,'8 while others hold
that the element of virtual intent must be present.' 4 Justice Traynor, in
Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co., said:
"Some jurisdictions... distinguish between ordinary and gross
negligence. This distinction amounts to a rule of policy that a
failure to excercise due care in those situations where the risk
of harm is great will give rise to legal consequences harsher
than those arising from negligence in less hazardous situa-
tions."15
The Wisconsin court held that, "... in order to constitute gross
negligence there must be'either a wilful intent t6 injure or that reck-
less and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of another or his
property, and that willingness to inflict injury which the law deems
equivalent to an intent to injure."' 6 This opinion is in obvious dis-
agreement with Altman v. Aronson which laid down the rule that gross
negligence, though of an aggravated character, fell short of being "such
reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wil-
ful and intentional wrong."'
7
What, then, considering the diversity of conflicting and contradic-
tory decisions, is gross negligence? This question can hardly be ap-
proached, much less answered, without an understanding of the origin
of the term and its historical development.
HIsToRicAL DEVELOPMENT
The concept of gross negligence is an offshoot of the Roman law.' 8
There is some controversy at the present time as to just what the
state of the Roman law was insofar as negligence is concerned. It is
held by some writers that there were no degrees of negligence in
Roman jurisprudence; that Roman law did not demand a higher de-
gree of care than that of a prudent man of affairs, and that the many
comparatives and superlatives found in extant documents were not
used to mark technical distinctions. 9 However, it would seem that
at the time of Justinian there were actually two degrees of negli-
gence, "culpa lata" and "culpa levis."2 ' "Culpa" was a "fault" consist-
" Wilson v. Etheredge, 214 S.C. 396, 52 S.E. 2d 812, 814 (1949).
12 State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W. 2d 480, 487 (1946).
'3 See notes 54, 55 infra.
'4 Garric v. Florida C. & P. R. Co., 53 S.C. 448, 31 S.E. 334 (1898); Hays v.
Gainsville Street R. Co., 70 Tex. 602, 8 S.W. 491 (1888).
'5 118 P. 2d 465, 469 (Cal. 1941).
'6 Bentson v. Brown, 168 Wis. 629, 633, 203 N.W. 380 (1925).
'7231 Mass. 588, 592 (1919).
28 BIGELOW, TORTS 118 (8th ed. 1907); PROSSER, Tors 265 (1941); The Three
Degrees of Negligence, 8 Am. L. REv. 655 (1874).
19 The Three Degrees of Negligence, supra, n. 18 at 663; Green, High Care
and Gross Negligence, 23 ILL. L. REv. 15 (1928).
20 483-565 A.D.
21 Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. C,.F.- L. Ray. 99 (1933).
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ing of positive conduct which made performance of a contractual ob-
ligation impossible. It also included heedless omissions. 22 The Roman
jurist had an established standard of conduct whereby it could be deter-
mined when one was guilty of "culpa." This standard was not a sol-
itary one, but was actually comprised of several standards, each of
which applied to certain types of basic obligations and gave rise to cor-
responding degrees of "culpa."
23
"Culpa lata," or gross neglect, was a failure to use the care of any
ordinary person of reasonable intelligence.2 4 This degree of "culpd'
seems to have had little reference to contract law, but was quite gen-
erally used in both criminal law and the field of quasi-contracts. 25 It set
up the standard of an ordinary, reasonable man, and included those
acts which even a man of grossest intellect would not have committed. 26
The, second degree of "cupid' was "cupla levis" or ordinary fault,
which was a failure to conform to the conduct of a prudent business-
man.2 7 A higher degree of diligence than that exercised by the ordi-
nary man was demanded as the standard of conduct. "Culpa levis"
did not have to be proved, but was presumed from the fact of injury.2 8
The Roman law of negligence dealt mostly with contractual obliga-
tions such as bailments, but did not apply to torts, that is, wrongs
which were independent of contract. Tort liability was not in any way
dependent on the state of mind of the wrong-doers. It was immaterial
whether a tort-feasor inflicted injury on another or his property in-
tentionally or inadvertently, for he was required to repair the injury
regardless of the circumstances.29
BAILMENT
The idea of gross negligence appeared in England at the height
of the Middle Ages in Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae.30 Bracton drew heavily on the Institutes of Justinian and in-
corporated much of the Roman theory regarding degrees of negligence
as it was then thought to be.31 Though Bracton's treatise was a major
legal beacon for several centuries, his treatment of bailments lay dor-
mant for some four hundred years. During part of this period, the or-
dinary bailee was held absolutely liable for any injury, and the action
brought against him was properly in detinue.3 2 However, the bailee
22 Id. at 98; The Three Degrees of Negligence, supra, n. 18.
23Supra, n. 21.
24 Ibid.




29 Ibid. at 102 ;The Three Degrees of Negligence, supra, n. 18 at 663 et. seq.
30 High Care and Gross Negligence, supra, n. 19 at 12.
31 Ibid.
32 Arterburn, The Early Liability of a Bailee, 25 MICH. L. REv. 480 (1927).
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
could wager at law, that is, have witnesses swear that they believed
him, and thus he could defeat the action. After 1488, however, action
on the case against bailees became more common. Even though the
liability was less strict under the latter action, the bailee could not
have his wager at law.33 Thus assumpsit, a tort action, which de-
veloped into action on the case, came into the field of bailments. The
bailor no longer sued on any breach of contract, but held the bailee
answerable in tort.3 4
The first real attempt to systematize the law of bailments occurred
in Coggs v. Bernard.35 In that case, the defendant undertook, without
compensation, to transport some casks of brandy from one cellar to
another. However, he was negligent in handling them and one of the
casks splintered, causing all the brandy to flow on the ground. The
plaintiff sought to hold the gratuitous bailee liable for the loss. Lord
Holt in handing down his opinion, revived the dormant degrees of
negligence as set forth by Bracton and outlined what is now the law
of bailments. He set up six kinds of bailments and then proceeded to
state the liability and degree of care which were attached to each.38
Sir William Jones in his Essay on the Law of Bailments, published
in 1781, attempted to revise some of Lord Holt's ideas and then pro-
pounded his grouping of the degrees of negligence. His work was to
cement the doctrine of the degrees of negligence:
"GROSS neglect, lata culpa . . . is in practice considered as
equivalent to DOLUS or FRAUD, itself; and consists, accord-
ing to the best interpreters, in the omission of that care, which
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take of their
property ... ."
"ORDINARY neglect, levis culpa, is the want of that diligence
which the generality of mankind use in their own concerns; that
is, ordinary care."
"SLIGHT neglect, levissima culpa, is the omission of that care
which very attentive and vigilant persons take of their own
goods, or in other words, of very exact diligence."37
However, Jones was incorrect in supposing that "levissima culpa"
was a degree of negligence in Roman law.38 Nevertheless, even after
this was pointed out by later commentators, slight neglect continued
to be an important part of the division of negligence into degrees.
ToRmS
Once the tripartite division of negligence had become well estab-
lished in the field of bailments, it is not surprising that the concept
3 Ibid.
84 Davidge, Bailment, 41 L. Q. REv. 436 (1925).
35 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
s Ibid; High Care and Gross Negligence, supra, n. 19 at 12; The Three De-
grees of Negligence, smpra, n. 18 at 652.
37 JoNEs, EssAY ON THE LAw OF BAXLMENTS 21 et. seq. (3d ed. 1828).
38 Supra, n. 21 at 111.
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carried over into the field of torts. The general contractual background
of gross negligence and the other degrees were ignored in the interest
of consistency and stare decisis. Th first application of bailment neg-
ligence to the field of torts seems to have taken place early in the
Nineteenth Century.39 Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Law
of Bailments, was largely responsible for bringing the degrees of
negligence into American law.
4 0
Thus it can be seen that gross negligence, which had its inception
in Roman contract and criminal law, reflowered in English bailment
law in the Eighteenth Century and then branched out into torts in the
early Nineteenth Century. Liability in both fields, although absolute
in both Roman and early English law, became gradually relative. Gross
negligence as a bailment concept remained somewhat stable because of
the underlying contractual relationship whereby particular duties could
be ascertained, but gross negligence as a tort concept became a lab-
yrinth of involved definitions and reasoning.
THE FOUR AMERICAN POSITIONS
Is it possible, then, to find a common denominator in American de-
cisions, whereby gross negligence could be defined in a manner which
would be acceptable to all or even most jurisdictions in the United
States? The answer to this question is, apparently, in the negative
when the elements comprising gross negligence are considered. Gross
negligence in American law cannot be defined in any exact manner
when it is separated from a particular jurisdiction.4 '
Since it is not possible to define gross negligence as such, the
basic American attitudes toward the term should be pointed out.
Roughly speaking, there are four general categories of reasoning into
which gross negligence must fall. Two of these categories of reasoning
affirm gross negligence as a meaningful term, and two of them deny
the concept any real significance.
The fundamental conflict in those states, which have retained gross
negligence in their substantive law, is whether gross negligence differs
from ordinary negligence only as a matter of degree or whether the
difference is really one of kind. Intent is the key factor differentiating
the two views, for once the element of intent, whether it be implied
or actual, is added, a different kind of negligence comes into being.
Wisconsin serves as a good example of those states which hold that
gross negligence is a different kind of negligence. In Wedel v. Klein,4
2
the court held that ordinary negligence and gross negligence were dis-
39 HARPER, TORTS 152 (1938); PRoSSER, TORTS 170 (1941).
40 High Care and Gross Negligence, supra, n. 19 at 7.
i' Supra, n. 21 at 115.
42229 Wis. 419, 422, 282 N.W. 606, 607 (1938); accord, State ex rel Zent v.
Yanny, 244 Wis. 342, 345 (1943).
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tinct kinds of negligence, since the former constituted inadvertence
while the latter fell within the area of actual or constructive intent to
harm. Other decisions emanating from the same supreme court de-
clared that inadvertence must be absent from gross negligence,43 and
that wilful or wanton misconduct must be present. 4 It should be noted
that, in Wisconsin, gross negligence does not include ordinary negli-
gence and that proof of the former does not prove the latter.45 The
Supreme Court of Michigan, in holding that gross negligence and
ordinary negligence were of a different character and that gross negli-
gence was not merely a higher degree of negligence, declared:
"Ordinary negligence does not signify the wantonness or
wilfulness that are necessary elements of gross negligence
which, however, does include ordinary negligence combined
with a wilful and wanton disregard for public safety. '46
A Federal case, based on Texas law, sums up quite well the position
of those courts which agree with the Wisconsin view:
"Gross negligence connotes a conscious indifference to the safety
of others. Recovery therefore is confined to cases where the neg-
ligence is wilful or so gross as to indicate wantonness, reckless-
ness, or malice. The plaintiff must show, not merely that the de-
fendant could or should have foreseen and prevented the in-
jury, but that he acted intentionally or with a degree of negli-
gence which approximates a fixed purpose to bring about the
injury of which the plaintiff complains. Mere indifference to
another's safety is not enough."4 7
The Wisconsin view on gross negligence is, however, an unortho-
dox legal position.48 Those courts which continue to regard gross neg-
ligence as one of the divisions of negligence, but deny the element of
intent, have come to regard the difference between gross and ordinary
negligence as merely a matter of degree of negligence.4 9 This concept
has been expressed in many ways. It has been held to be negligence of
an aggravated character,5 0 the absence of slight care,51 great or much
43 Willard v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 150 Wis. 234, 136 N.W. 646 (1912);
Astin v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 143 Wis. 477, 128 N.W. 265 (1910);
Prentiss v. Strand, 116 Wis. 647, 93 N.W. 816 (1902).
44 Kuchler v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 157 Wis. 107, 146 N.W. 1133; Wil-
lard v. Chicago, supra, n. 43.
45 Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 297, 101 N.W. 672, 675 (1904).
46 Wieczorek v. Merskin, 208 Mich. 145, 13 N.W. 2d 239, 240 (1944); accord,
Louisville etc., R. Co. v. Orr, 121 Ala. 489, 26 So. 35 (1899).
47 Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 202 F. 2d 421, 423 (5th Cir., 1953).
48 Supra, n. 21 at 117.
49 Dinardi v. Herook, 105 N.E. 2d 197 (Mass. 1952; James v. Krebeck, 142 Neb.
757, 7 N.W. 2d 637 (1943); Oliver v. Kantor, supra, n. 1; Sorrell v. While,
103 Vt. 277, 153 A. 359 (1931); Thornhill v. Thornhill, 172 Va. 553, 2 S.E.
2d 318 (1939).
50 Altman v. Aronson, supra, n. 17.
51 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. George, supra, n. 10 at 988.
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negligence, 52 and as such heedless and reckless disregard of the rights
of another as should shock fair minded men.53 Professor Chapin
pointed out that negligence must be distinguished from intentional
wrongs since it presupposes culpable inadvertence. The terms wilful
negligence or wanton negligence, he says, are actually contradictions
in terms.54 A Virginia court seconded this contention by declaring
that ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention,
while both differ in kind from intentional conduct which ought to be
known to have a tendency to harm.5 5 In Kastel v. Stieber, a California
case, it was held that:
"We should not confuse 'gross negligence' with 'wilful miscon-
duct' because there is a clear distinction between the two terms.
: * , Whenever the element of knowldge and wilfulness enters
into the act, it ceases to be negligence .... 56
The majority of states and numerous legal writers totally reject
the term gross negligence as a degree or kind of negligence. This
move was an inevitable reaction to the confusion engendered by at-
tempts to subdivide negligence into neat compartments. The difficulty,
in applying the degrees of negligence to concrete cases, led the Su-
preme Court of the United States to declare that it disapproved of at-
tempts to fix the degrees of negligence by legal definitions because,
after all, negligence meant only the absence of the care necessary
under the circumstances."7 A small number of states which joined the
revolt stopped at a kind of halfway house. They rejected gross negli-
gence and the lesser degrees of negligence as having no distinctive
meaning or importance. Instead, they adopted the positive expression
of departmentalized negligence, the degrees of care. The circumstances,
they felt, merely called for different degrees of care :51
"We do not recognize degrees of negligence; . . . The law
recognizes degrees in care, very high care, and ordinary care,
but the failure to exercise the highest degree of care required
is only negligence, whilst failure to exercise ordinary care is
also negligence, neither more nor less."59
The fourth category of state decisions reject both degrees of care
and of negligence. This view appears to be the trend of legal reasoning
52 James v. Krebeck, supra, n. 49.
53 Krueger v. Taylor, 132 F. 2d 736 (D.C. Cir., 1943) ; Carrol v. Miller, 175 Va.
388, 9 S.E. 2d 322, 326 (1940).
54 CHAPIN, TORTS 499, 500 (1917).
55Thornhill v. Thornhill, supra, n. 49 at 322.
56 83 Cal. Dec. 249, 8 P. 2d 474, 478 (1932).
5" Oregon Co. v. Roe, 176 F. 715, 718 (9th Cir., 1910); Preston v. Prather,
137 U.S. 604, 608 (1890); Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S.
489, 494 (1875); Steamboat New World v. King, supra, n. 1 at 474.
58 Diamond State Iron Co. v. Giles, 7 Houst. 557, 11 A. 189 (Del. 1887);
Murray v. De Luxe Motor Stages of Ill., 133 S.W. 2d 1074 (Mo. 1939).
59 Young v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 227 Mo. 307, 127 S.W. 19, 26 (1910).
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today.60 Rolfe, B., in Wilson v. Brett,61 began the assault against gross
negligence by declaring that he could see no difference between negli-
gence and gross negligence, that gross negligence was merely negligence
with a vituperative epithet. The Federal Courts, early in their history,
began to disapprove of gross negligence as a division of negligence. 
2
In N.Y.C. R R Co. v. Lockwood, the United States Supreme Court
held that:
"'.. . negligence, whatever epithet we give it, is failure to bestow
the care and skill which the situation demands; and hence it
is more strictly accurate, perhaps, to call is simply 'negligence'."
0 3
But it is interesting to note, in the Lockwood case, the United
States Supreme Court modified its earlier decisions by refusing to re-
ject degrees of care or diligence. Thus, if there is anything of a "Fed-
eral" rule, it is that there are no degrees of negligence, but that there
are degrees of care.8 '
State decisions, rejecting the "degree" theories, indicate that al-
though the amount of care required varies with the circumstances, the
degree of care remains the same-appropriate care under the circum-
stances." The underlying idea is that perilous situations call for greater
care and precaution than slightly dangerous ones, not because the
measure of duty is greater, but because the precautions which a reason-
able man would take are greater. As Professor Harper said:
".... there are no degrees of care, as a matter of law; there are
merely different amounts of care as a matter of fact."8 6
RELATED PROBLEMS
There are a number of other questions which must be considered
in any analysis of gross negligence in order to complete the concept.
First, is gross negligence a positive or a negative entity? This question
has perhaps been answered. Jurisdictions, holding that gross negligence
involves intentional conduct, arrive at the conclusion that gross negli-
gence is positive in nature,67 while all other jurisdictions view gross
negligence as a negative term.68
60 PRossER, TORTS 38 (1941).
6 11 M. & W. 113, 152 Eng. Rep. 737 (1843).
62 Steamboat New World v. King, supra, n. 1; supra, n. 60.
63 17 Wall. 357, 383 (1873).
64 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 151 (1891); Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74,
76 (7th Cir., 1905).65 Thompson v. Ashba, 102 N.E. 2d 519 521 (Ind. 1951); Indiana Ins. Co. v.
Handlon, 24 N.E. 2d 1003, 1006 (Ind. 1940); Nadeau v. Fogg, 70 A. 2d 730,
732, (Me. 1950); Rea v. Simowitz, 35 S.E. 2d 871, 874 (N.C. 1945); Note,
YALE L. J. 555 (1922).6 6 HARPEp, ToRTs 74 (1938).67 Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., supra, n. 47; Bennett v. Hovard, 170
S.W. 2d 709, 713 (Tex. 1943).
68 Davenport v. Southern R. Co., 135 F. 960, 967 (1905) ; Giminez v. Rissen, 12
Cal. App. 2d 152, 55 P. 2d 292, 296 (1936) ; State v. Arnold, 3 Terry .47, 27
1953-541
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Second, is gross negligence a definition or merely a description?
Courts, holding that gross negligence is a degree or kind of negligence,
agree that it is a definition. Jurisdictions, which have done away with
the subdivisions of negligence and care, consider the term as one
merely of description. 69
And last of all, is gross negligence conduct or is it a state of
mind? The great weight of authority today is that gross negligence
is conduct evaluated without regard to the particular state of mind of
the actor.7 0 It is then unreasonably dangerous conduct under the cir-
cumstances:
"The individual's actual mental characteristics and qualities,
capacities and habits, reactions and processes, are not, then,
among the circumstances which the law considers in determining
whether (a defendant's) conduct was under the circumstances,
reasonably safe."7 1
The law sets up an external standard for the protection of society,
the ordinary, reasonable man. The law seeks to protect society from
conduct, not states of mind, which is unreasonably likely to cause
harm. Thus, the particular mental failing which causes gross negligence
is unimportant in determining liability.7 2
DANIEL O. HowARD
A. 2d 81, 83 (1942); Sellman v. Hess, 15 Wash. 2d 310, 130 P. 2d 688, 689
(1942).
69 CLARC, TORTS 134 (1922); 3 COOLEY, TORTS §478 (4th ed., Haggard, 1932).7OBiGE.Low, ToRTs 108, 109 .(8th ed. 1907); HARPER, TORTS 71 (1938); PRos-
SEP, ToRTs 30 (1941) ; Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference;
The Relation of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1926);
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).71 Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; The Relation of Mental States
to Negligence, supra, n. 70 at 857.
72 Ibid. at 856 et. seq.
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